17-01-2006, 07:28 PM
Thanks guys, interesting. as I said in my initial post, I had assumed that one reason was to avoid having the pilots do mental gynastics and busy
phases of lfight. what is interesting about this though, then, is that it makes the controller's job more challenging because two aircraft at the
same IAS will not have the same GS. From the controllers' perspective, the simplest thing would be to insist on a GS and let the pilots work out how
to conform. I didn't think about AOA because these speeds are normally well above stall for most aircraft (250 KIAS and 200/156 KIAS, etc.). I
suppose if a controller issued a GS restriction that would require the pilot to have an KTAS/KIAS too close to stalling, the pilot could refuse it.
Anyway that is not the way the system works.
I've read Stick and Rudder (and a number of others) but what i enjoyed about this book is the controller's perspective. He gives some interesting
perspectives, The author worked in many places but I think he now works approach at ATL. For example, he tells a story about how he knew exactly what
a pilot wanted (the pilot wanted an intersection takeoff) but didn't know to ask for the waiver of separation distance restrictions). the controller
coundln't suggest this, so the pilot just kept holding at the intersection because the controller could not issue a takeofff clearance that would
insure separation in the busy airspace without inconveniencing many other aircraft. Both the controller and the pilot knew however that a safe
takeoff was possible but the pilot just didn't know what to ask for. There are also some examples of ill-advsed pilot requests and planning that
ended trajically. And some hilarious ones, like your example of the skids above. I also learned a lot if odd tidbits. There were also some segments
that were a little slow reading, like a pretty lengthy discussion of what information in a filed plan is and is not useful to a controller. i suppose
controllers get goosebumps over these things, but seemed pretty dull to me :-)
warm wishes all
phases of lfight. what is interesting about this though, then, is that it makes the controller's job more challenging because two aircraft at the
same IAS will not have the same GS. From the controllers' perspective, the simplest thing would be to insist on a GS and let the pilots work out how
to conform. I didn't think about AOA because these speeds are normally well above stall for most aircraft (250 KIAS and 200/156 KIAS, etc.). I
suppose if a controller issued a GS restriction that would require the pilot to have an KTAS/KIAS too close to stalling, the pilot could refuse it.
Anyway that is not the way the system works.
I've read Stick and Rudder (and a number of others) but what i enjoyed about this book is the controller's perspective. He gives some interesting
perspectives, The author worked in many places but I think he now works approach at ATL. For example, he tells a story about how he knew exactly what
a pilot wanted (the pilot wanted an intersection takeoff) but didn't know to ask for the waiver of separation distance restrictions). the controller
coundln't suggest this, so the pilot just kept holding at the intersection because the controller could not issue a takeofff clearance that would
insure separation in the busy airspace without inconveniencing many other aircraft. Both the controller and the pilot knew however that a safe
takeoff was possible but the pilot just didn't know what to ask for. There are also some examples of ill-advsed pilot requests and planning that
ended trajically. And some hilarious ones, like your example of the skids above. I also learned a lot if odd tidbits. There were also some segments
that were a little slow reading, like a pretty lengthy discussion of what information in a filed plan is and is not useful to a controller. i suppose
controllers get goosebumps over these things, but seemed pretty dull to me :-)
warm wishes all
![[Image: c8.gif]](http://www.fspassengers.com/images/banner/sig/c8.gif)